The latest round of international negotiations in Copenhagen led to a set of commitments on emission reduction which are unlikely to stabilise global warming below or around 2°C. As a consequence, in the absence of additional ambitious policy measures, adaptation will be needed to address climate related damages. What is the role of adaptation in this setting? How is it optimally allocated across regions and time? To address these questions, this paper analyses the optimal mix of adaptation and mitigation expenditures in a cost-effective setting in which countries cooperate to achieve a long-term stabilisation target (550 CO2-eq). It uses an Integrated Assessment Model (AD-WITCH) that describes the relationships between different adaptation modes (reactive and anticipatory), mitigation, and capacity building to analyse the optimal portfolio of adaptation measures. Results show the optimal intertemporal distribution of climate policy measures is characterised by early investments in mitigation followed by large adaptation expenditures a few decades later. Hence, the possibility to adapt does not justify postponing mitigation, although it reduces its costs.
Introduction
The emission reduction commitments proposed at the end of COP XV in Copenhagen will probably fail to stabilise global warming below or around the 2°C target. According to most assessments, the proposed emission reductions can lead to a temperature increase above 3°C by the end of the century 2 . In this context, adaptation becomes a necessary measure and must be planned well in advance. Investments in adaptation may indeed be quite costly.
Socio-economic systems have a large potential to adapt to climate change, but market signals might not be sufficient to induce the necessary expenditure (Bosello et al. 2010a ). Marketdriven adaptation can have a strong damage-smoothing potential at the global level, yet global damages remain positive. This form of market-driven adaptation works well if markets function properly, which is not always the case. Finally, some forms of damage and their distributional implications cannot be addressed by markets (e.g. some biodiversity losses). Hence, policy-driven, or planned adaptation plays a leading role, especially in developing countries.
Most literature has explored the relationship between mitigation and adaptation using a costbenefit set-up 3 : adaptation is modelled as an aggregated strategy fostered by some form of planned spending, which can directly reduce climate change damage. The pioneering contribution in this field is Hope (1993) , who proposed the first effort to integrate mitigation and adaptation into the PAGE Integrated Assessment Model. PAGE, however, defines adaptation exogenously and therefore it cannot determine the optimal characteristics of a mitigation and adaptation portfolio.
The first assessments of the optimal mix of adaptation and mitigation where both mitigation and adaptation are endogenous have been proposed by Bosello (2008) , Bosello et al. (2010 ), de Bruin et al. (2007 , and de Bruin et al. (2009) . All these studies conclude that adaptation and mitigation are strategic complements: the optimal policy consists of a mix of adaptation measures and investments in mitigation, both in the short and long-term, even though mitigation will only decrease damages in later periods. All authors also highlight the existence of a trade-off between the two strategies: because resources are scarce, investing more into mitigation implies fewer resources for adaptation. Moreover, successful adaptation reduces the marginal benefit of mitigation and a successful mitigation effort reduces the damage to which it is necessary to adapt. This, again, explains the trade off between the two strategies. However, the second effect is notably weaker than the first one. Mitigation, especially in the short-medium term, only slightly lowers the environmental damage stock and therefore does little to decrease the need to adapt.
Finally, all the aforementioned studies stress that adaptation is a more effective option to reduce climate change damage, especially if agents have a strong preference for the present (high discount rates), or early climate damages are expected. This outcome depends on the cost and benefit functions driving the decision to spend on mitigation and adaptation, which are based on the standard damage functions used in most integrated assessment models, i.e. the one from Nordhaus' DICE/RICE models. These damage functions include at best, extreme, but not catastrophic events, and no uncertainty.
In light of the recent outcomes of international negotiations, this paper analyses adaptation from a novel perspective. It assumes that a global mitigation policy will successfully manage to stabilise GHG concentrations at 550 ppm-e by the end of the century. This target is less ambitious than the 2°C target, but still quite demanding and difficult to achieve. Given this mitigation path, this paper explores the following: how adaptation should be optimally designed to address the damage not eliminated by mitigation, how different adaptation strategies should be combined, and should the equity-adverse impact of climate change be addressed. It also stresses the different time scale of adaptation and mitigation, and gives some indications on key priorities for adaptation policy.
Adaptation modelling and calibration
The AD-WITCH model links adaptation, mitigation, and climate change damage within an integrated assessment model of the world economy, where the energy and climate system are carefully described. AD-WITCH builds on the WITCH model (Bosetti et al. 2006 development of a region. The degree of economic development affects the final impact of climate change on the economic system: for example, a high-population-growth and low-income-per-capita region is more prone to suffer from climate change than a low-population, high-income-per-capita region (Parry et al. 2007 , Parry 2009 ). Specific adaptive capacity building refers to all dedicated investments that are specifically targeted at facilitating adaptation activities. Examples falling within this category are the improvement of meteorological services and of early warning systems, the development of climate modelling and impact assessment, and, above all, technological innovation for adaptation purposes.
Anticipatory adaptation gathers all the measures where a stock of defensive capital must already be operational when the damage materialises. A typical example of these activities is coastal protection. Anticipatory adaptation is characterised by some economic inertia as investments in defensive capital take some time before translating into effective protection capital. Therefore, investments must begin before the damage occurs, and, if well designed, become effective in the medium, long-term.
By contrast, reactive adaptation describes the actions that are put in place when climate related damages effectively materialise. Examples of reactive actions are expenditures for air conditioning or treatments for climate-related diseases. These actions must be undertaken period by period to accommodate damages not avoided by anticipatory adaptation. They need to be constantly adjusted to changes in climatic conditions.
An "adaptation tree" (Figure 1 ) assembles these adaptation strategies into a sequence of nested CES functions (see Annex I for all model equations). (right). In the first nest, generic adaptive capacity building is represented by an exogenous trend increasing at the rate of total factor productivity. Specific adaptive capacity building is modelled as a stock variable, which accumulates over time with adaptation-specific investments. In the second nest, anticipatory adaptation is also modelled as a stock of defensive capital. Because it is subject to economic inertia (initial investments in adaptation takes five years to accrue to the defensive stock), anticipatory adaptation must be planned in advance. Once it has been built up, defensive capital does not disappear, but it remains effective over time subject to a depreciation rate. Reactive adaptation is modelled as a flow expenditure: it represents an instantaneous response to climate damage in each period, and it is independent upon the expenditure undertaken in previous periods.
Adaptive capacity building and other adaptation activities are modelled as substitutes.
Similarly, reactive and anticipatory adaptation are also modelled as substitutes. After a careful sensitivity analysis, we chose a mild substitution degree (substitution elasticity is 1.2 in both cases).
On the contrary, general and specific adaptive capacity are modelled as gross complements Investments in specific adaptive capacity building, in anticipatory adaptation measures, and reactive adaptation expenditure are control variables. The cost of each item is also included in the domestic budget constraint.
The integration of these adaptation strategies into a unified framework is a first major contribution to the literature, which previously focused either on reactive (de Bruin et al. 2009) or anticipatory measures (Bosello 2008) , and which neglected the role of adaptive capacity building (Bosello et al. 2010) . A second novel feature of the model is an updated calibration of macroregional adaptation costs and effectiveness. Agrawala et al. (2010) . 6 In a sequence of sensitivity tests we verify the robustness of our results to many different assumptions on the degree of substitutability among adaptive options. Results are robust to different parameterisation. They are available upon request. * The regional disaggregation adopted by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) does not perfectly correspond to the one used in WITCH and AD-WITCH.
In the calibration procedure, this paper integrates the original database of the WITCH model with Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Agrawala and Fankhauser (2008) , which provide the most recent and complete assessment on costs and benefits of adaptation strategies. originating an adaptation cost consistent with the observations. Third, the calibrated total climate change costs are reasonably similar to the reference values. The main explanation is that consistency needs to be guaranteed across three interconnected items: adaptation costs, total damage, and protection levels. Adaptation costs and damages move together. For instance, it is not possible to lower adaptation costs in Western Europe (WEURO) to bring them closer to their reference value without decreasing total damage, which is already lower than the reference.
Although we are fully aware of these shortcomings, we also recognise that the quantitative assessment of adaptation costs and benefits is still at a pioneering stage and that some areas (e.g.
agriculture and health) and regions (especially developing countries) still lack reliable data.
This study respects the observed ordinal ranking of adaptation costs and effectiveness which, given the overwhelming uncertainty, can be considered as informative as a perfect replication of the data.
Model baseline with endogenous adaptation strategies
Economic growth in the AD-WITCH baseline scenario closely replicates the Gross World Product (GWP) path of the B2 IPCC SRES scenario. Population peaks in 2070, at almost 9.6 billion, slightly decreasing thereafter to reach 9.1 billion in 2100. CO2 emissions are more similar to the A2 IPCC SRES scenario until 2030. Afterwards they grow at a lower rate, reaching 23 billion tons in 2100.
The baseline scenario endorses a non-cooperative view of international relationships, which implies that no cooperative mitigation effort is undertaken. In a non-cooperative world, the public good-nature of mitigation features a free riding incentive that reduces mitigation activity to almost zero. By contrast, adaptation is a private good whose benefits are fully appropriable, at least within the macroeconomic region where it is implemented 7 . Accordingly, it is also a viable strategy in a non-cooperative setting.
As Figure 2 shows, according to our results, the optimal level of adaptation that equalises regional marginal costs and benefits is substantial. In 2100, for the world as a whole, adaptation roughly halves damages from US$13 (3.8% of GWP) to 6 Trillion (1.8% of GWP). Those 7 US$ Trillion of avoided damages in 2100, represent about 2% of GWP. Adaptation becomes sizeable only after 2040, when climate change damage is sufficiently high to justify strong adaptation expenditure.
Despite adaptation, residual damage remains high throughout the century, and in 2100, climate damage is almost 2% of world GDP. In 2100, residual damages accounts for 73% of total climate change costs, while the remaining 27% is the cost of adaptation. (US$ 374 Billion out of 2331). This result indicates that building specific adaptive capacity is initially more important, because it enables the economic system to effectively develop and exploit adaptation strategies thereafter. Once the required capacity has been developed, even though capacity building continues to grow, there is more room to direct actions against climate damages. Figure 4 describes the composition of anticipatory and reactive adaptation strategies. Again they are both increasing throughout the century, but anticipatory adaptation starts earlier. This is because defensive capital must be ready when the damage materialises, and it faces at least a fiveyear economic inertia. On the contrary, reactive adaptation by definition alleviates the damage instantaneously and can be put in place immediately after the damage occurs.
Note also that anticipatory adaptation is the main adaptation strategy until 2085. Reactive adaptation prevails afterwards. This reflects the convex-in-temperature climate damage. As time goes by, damages increase at a rate that requires a growing support of reactive measures, which become the main options in the long-run.
Due to the local nature of adaptation and the differences in regional vulnerability, regional adaptation patterns may differ substantially from what the global picture suggests. Such diversity is shown in Figure 5 , which emphasises the different size, timing, and composition of adaptive behaviour across developing and developed countries.
Developing countries are more exposed to climatic damages, therefore they are forced to spend more than OECD regions in all forms of adaptation either in percent of GDP ( Figure 5 ) or in absolute terms (Table 2 ). In 2100, adaptation expenditure in non-OECD countries more than doubles that of OECD regions. Not surprisingly, adaptation effort is particularly large in more In developing countries damage is not only higher, but also occurs earlier. For this reason, adaptation starts earlier than in OECD. The case of adaptive capacity building is interesting. Non-OECD countries should first build up a stock of adaptive capacity, an essential prerequisite for successful adaptation. In doing so, they face a development gap with developed countries.
Therefore, investments in specific adaptive capacity in developing countries are larger and grow faster during the first half of the century with respect to investments in developed countries. Finally, the composition of the adaptation portfolio also differs across countries. In OECD regions anticipatory adaptation clearly prevails, whereas in non-OECD countries anticipatory and reactive adaptation are almost equal. This difference depends on two factors: the regional characteristics of climate vulnerability and the level of economic development. In OECD countries, the higher share of climate change damages originates from loss of infrastructure and coastal areas, whose protection requires a form of adaptation that is largely anticipatory. In non-OECD countries, climate change affects agriculture, health, and the use of energy for space heating and cooling.
These damages can be accommodated more effectively through reactive measures. As OECD countries are richer, they can easily give up their present consumption to invest in adaptation measures that will become productive in the future. By contrast, non-OECD countries are compelled by resource scarcity to act in emergency.
Adaptation and mitigation: a portfolio approach to climate change policy
Having characterised baseline adaptation patterns, we now analyse how this picture may change in the presence of a mitigation policy. We assume that a global agreement aimed at stabilising GHG concentrations at 550 ppme (or 3.7 W/m2) is successfully reached. This stabilisation target is less ambitious than the 2°C target, but still quite difficult to achieve. We also assume that all regions have unlimited access to an international carbon market to maximise cost effectiveness. Permits are allocated on an equal emission per capita basis. Under these conditions, is there still room for adaptation? How much adaptation? Where? When? Can adaptation reduce the costs of mitigation?
Our main results are summarised by Table 3 , which breaks down the components of climate change costs, now including also mitigation investments, in three cases: the baseline (i.e. adaptation without mitigation), mitigation policy without adaptation, and mitigation policy with adaptation.
The last case characterises the mitigation-adaptation mix and is the center of our investigation.
Note (fourth column) that mitigation expenditure is initially much higher than adaptation.
Mitigation must start immediately, even though initial climate damage is very low, because it works against the inertia of the carbon cycle and of the energy system. In AD-WITCH, emission reduction is accomplished by decarbonising the power generation and the transport sector and by improving energy efficiency through innovation. Mitigation options require substantial long-term investments to become competitive and deployed on a large scale, therefore, they must occur earlier. By contrast, adaptation measures work "through" a much shorter economic inertia, and can be postponed until damages are effectively high. This, consistently with the AD-WITCH damage structure, occurs after 2030. Consequently, investments and expenditure in mitigation remain larger than those on adaptation throughout the century.
Mitigation lowers the need to adapt and crowds out adaptation expenditure (second versus fourth column). The crowding-out is particularly prominent after mid-century, when it reaches about 50%. Nonetheless, adaptation remains substantial and it still exceeds US$ 1 Trillion in 2100.
As for geographical distribution, adaptation is particularly concentrated in developing countries (Table 4) . Adaptation slightly increases the mitigation effort required to comply with the stabilisation target (fourth versus third column). Indeed, the possibility to adapt increases the amount of damage that can be endured, and thus the level of tolerable emissions. Therefore, reaching the GHG concentrations target requires a slightly higher abatement effort. Figure 6 provides further information. The left panel shows that in terms of damage reduction, the effect of the optimal adaptation investments identified in the baseline and of the optimal mitigation investment to reach the chosen stabilisation policy is roughly of the same order.
However, in terms of costs, the first is much cheaper than the second. Therefore, if the target were simply damage reduction with only one policy instrument at hand, adaptation would be preferred.
However, when the goal is to reduce the probability of climate change-induced catastrophes, by controlling temperature increase, adaptation is nearly useless (see Figure 6 , right panel) and only mitigation is effective. A portfolio of strategies brings welfare improvements as compared to using only one strategy. Thus this cost effectiveness framework replicates the typical first-best efficiency rule according to which two instruments can do no worse than one. Bosello et al. (2010) demonstrates that this also applies to optimal mitigation and adaptation policies.
Although a fairly ambitious mitigation policy target is adopted internationally and mitigation reduces climate damages, there is still room for adaptation. Again geographic differences are important. OECD regions experience lower damages under global mitigation than they would under optimal domestic adaptation (Table 3 ) and indeed they greatly reduce adaptation expenditure when both mitigation and adaptation are implemented (Table 4) 9 . In non-OECD regions the opposite occurs: residual damages are higher under the mitigation policy than under optimal domestic adaptation, thus mitigation reduces the need to adapt by a lower margin.
The net effect of combining adaptation and mitigation is a welfare improvement in the longterm. Initially, the additional expenditure on adaptation and the increased costs of mitigation are not compensated by the reduced damage, but as long as climate related damages increase, adaptation becomes more useful. Mitigation and adaptation confirm their mild substitutability and this justifies their joint use in a cost-effective portfolio of climate policies. 9 An interesting result shown by Table 4 is that a small adjustment in favour of reactive adaptation and investment in specific adaptive capacity is recognisable within the adaptation mix. Both adaptation classes, being "stocks", are more similar to mitigation among adaptation options. They suffer the strongest crowding out. The time and composition profile of adaptation remain almost unchanged with a moderate tilting toward reactive measures and capacity building.
Reactive Adaptation -53% -65% -49%
Anticipatory Adaptation -55% -66% -50%
Specific Adaptive Capacity Building -46% -66% -37%
Discussion and conclusions
This paper has investigated the relationship between mitigation and adaptation, as well as the interactions between capacity building and different adaptation measures. By adopting a macroeconomic perspective, it addressed issues of strategic planning and optimal public resource management in a cost-effective setting.
The analysis carried out in this paper emphasises the strategic differences between mitigation and adaptation. In contrast to mitigation, adaptation does not generate international externalities. Its benefits are appropriable domestically and it is not affected by free riding incentives that typically undermine the provision of public goods. As a consequence, adaptation is the main strategy to cope with climate change in a strictly non-cooperative framework.
Reactive and anticipatory adaptation measures are shown to be strategic complements that, together with investments in adaptive capacity, should belong to the optimal adaptation strategy.
Anticipatory adaptation measures become effective with a delay and should be implemented first.
They are the main adaptation strategy in the first half of the century, while reactive adaptation prevails afterwards. Investing in specific adaptive capacity building is also an early strategy, because capacity is a prerequisite for effective adaptation actions.
Adaptation needs largely differ across world regions. In developing countries, the size of adaptation investments that would be optimal on the basis of cost-benefit considerations might not be achievable. Both the rate of growth and the level of adaptation expenditures are far higher in poorer countries. The magnitude of resources needed is likely to be unavailable in these regions.
Therefore international cooperation efforts are needed to address distributional issues and financial constraints.
The optimal composition and timing of the adaptation portfolio also varies across regions.
Because of the heterogeneous distribution of climate change damages and of different resource endowments, non-OECD countries devote a relatively larger share of expenditure to reactive interventions, whereas OECD countries devote their expenditure to anticipatory interventions.
Adaptive capacity building is, however, particularly important in non-OECD countries. Again, international cooperation and financial and technological transfers are needed to fill this gap.
When mitigation policy is internationally coordinated and enforced, adaptation efforts are partly crowded-out. This result is consistent with previous studies that analysed the relationship between adaptation and mitigation in a cost-benefit setting (Bosello 2008 , Bosello et al. 2010 , de Bruin et al. 2007 , de Bruin and Dellink 2009 . Two additional considerations are worth mentioning.
Notwithstanding the success of mitigation to reduce climate change damages, as long as damages are positive and marginal costs of adaptation are increasing, there is still room for adaptation.
Optimal adaptation efforts remain substantial (above US$ 1 trillion in 2100) even in the presence of a GHG concentration stabilisation policy.
The integration of mitigation and adaptation is welfare improving. Total climate change costs are indeed lower in the presence of adaptation. On the other hand, mitigation should start immediately, even though initial climate damage is very low. The reason for early mitigation action is its long-term dimension. First, emission reductions today lead to lower temperature and damages only in the far future. Second, ambitious emission reductions require major changes in the energy infrastructure system, which has a slow capital turnover. Consequently, in the short-run, the optimal allocation of resources between adaptation and mitigation should be tilted towards mitigation.
Adaptation becomes increasingly important in the longer-run. Therefore, if the aim is to reduce the probability of catastrophic and possibly irreversible climate related damages, aggressive mitigation actions need to be implemented soon.
Annex I. Introducing adaptation into the Witch model
Four different adaptation expenditures have been considered in the present study.
Expenditure in adaptive capacity building is divided into a generic and a specific component.
Expenditure in adaptation activities includes anticipatory and reactive adaptation. The starting point for the implementation is the original WITCH climate change damage function:
In (1) damage from climate change (time and region specific) indicates a GDP loss measured by a gap between gross YG and net output YN. As in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) , the climate change damage function, CCD n,t is a reduced form relationship between temperature and output :
Its parameters have been calibrated to replicate a percentage change in GDP loss in response to a 2.5°C temperature increase above pre-industrial levels. The exponent γ is set to 2, to model a convex-in-temperature damage. The calibration of (2) compounds two components of climate change damage: adaptation costs and residual damages. We changed this in two ways. We specify the role of adaptation in reducing damage in (2). We then separated the cost component of adaptation from (2). The climate change damage function with adaptation becomes:
In equation (3), an increase in adaptation activities as a whole (ADAPT n,t ) reduces the negative impact from climate change on gross output. We have chosen the simplest functional form that presents, by construction, two agreeable properties: it is bounded between 0 and 1; an infinite amount of resources allocated to adaptation can reduce the residual climate change damage to 0 at the maximum. Adaptation exhibits decreasing marginal productivity, thus additional resources to adaptation become less and less effective in reducing damage.
As mentioned before, different methods of adapting can be chosen. Total adaptation,
ADAPT n,t is decomposed into its different forms by a sequence of Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) nests. The choice of the CES specification is determined by its great flexibility in representing the different degrees of substitutability and complementarity among its components.
By simply adjusting the CES exponents, alternative assumptions about the relationships between different adaptation strategies can easily be tested.
A first CES nest allocates resources to adaptive capacity-building (TCAP) or to adaptation activities (ACT) according to:
Adaptive capacity-building (TCAP) is a CES combination of generic (G_CAP) and specific (S_CAP) adaptation capacity:
Generic capacity captures every component that is not necessarily related to adaptation itself but to the economic development of a region. The underlined assumption is that the richer a region the more adaptable it is. Specific capacity depends not only on other forms of investment such as R&D for adaptation purposes and early warning systems, but also on institutional capacity. G_CAP follows an exogenous trend mimicking the growth rate of total factor productivity. The initial value is an indicator of local capacity based on human capital and knowledge stock:
Specific adaptive capacity building is modelled as a stock , which accumulates over time with adaptation-specific investments,
according to a standard discrete-time law of motion:
The stock depreciates at a rate of δ CAP, which has been set equal to 3% per year. Investments in specific capacity have been set to be approximately 1% of world expenditure on education and total R&D in the calibration year. In absolute terms this amounts to US$ 164 Billion in 2060. This global amount has been distributed across different regions proportionally to the normalised share of education expenditure over GDP. This criteria corrects the otherwise uneven distribution of R&D investments highly concentrated in developed countries. Total adaptive capacity increases the effectiveness of adaptation activities. Adaptation activities, proactive or reactive, compose another CES nest according to: The stock depreciates at a rate δ PAD that equals the depreciation rate of physical capital, 10% per year. Expenditure in the three adaptation measures (generic capacity is an exogenous trend) is accounted in the national income identity: Only residual damage remains in the climate change damage function. Accordingly, the damage function must be defined by a new parameterisation of equation (2), which excludes adaptation costs. The calibration process of (3) and the other equations of the AD-WITCH model is described in Annex II. Residual damage is defined as the difference between gross and net output.
From equation (1) we have:
Using equation (2) and equation (3), residual damage can be defined as follows:
Annex II: Sensitivity Analysis
The robustness of our baseline results is tested against changes in two key parameters: the size of climatic damage and the pure rate of time preference (PRTP). Climate change damage estimates have always been uncertain, but the most recent literature (Parry et al. 2007 , Stern 2007 , UNFCCC 2007 , and Hanemann 2008 has revised upward initial assessments. Furthermore AD-WITCH, like most IAMs, abstracts from very rapid warming and large-scale changes of the climate system (system surprises), thus its proposed damage estimates are likely to underestimate the real magnitude of the phenomenon. PRTP is expected to have major influences on the adaptation mix as it governs the perception of present and future as well as the incentives to choose one option or the other.
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In addition to our baseline damage, we also analyse a high-damage case, about twice the former. In addition to our baseline PRTP, which is 3% declining over time in line with Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), a lower PRTP equal to 0.1% declines in line with Stern (2007) . As expected, when damages increase or the PRTP decreases, all adaptation options are fostered. There are also changes in their relative weight within the adaptation mix. A higher damage slightly favours reactive adaptation, which increases by 105% in 2100, as opposed to 97% of anticipatory adaptation and 57% of specific capacity. A lower PRTP favours anticipatory adaptation and adaptive capacity building (respectively +37% and +49% in 2100). Although it shows the highest percentage increase, it still absorbs a minor fraction of total adaptation expenditure (between 13 to 20%). When high damage is combined with low PRTP, the discounting effect tends to prevail and the optimal mix is slightly tilted toward stock measures, namely anticipatory adaptation and specific adaptive capacity. This indicates that higher damages are contrasted relatively better with reactive measures which perform indifferently well in the short-term and the long-term. Higher future damages that are implicitly associated to a lower PRTP, can be contrasted relatively better with anticipatory measures which requires more time to be put in place, but can be more effective in the future. 10 There is a longstanding controversy regarding the PRTP (Weitzman 2001) . In line with a long line of economists (Ramsey 1928 , Harrod 1948 , Solow 1974 , Stern (2007) argues on ethical grounds for a near-zero PRTP, while others dismiss this argument because it is inconsistent with actual individual behaviour (Nordhaus 2007; Weitzman 2007a ). Lower PRTP and higher impacts from climate change also anticipate optimal adaptation expenditure (Table AII. 2). A higher damage imposes spending on adaptation US$ 0.8 Billion already in 2010. This surpasses US$ 3 Billion if high damage is coupled with a low PRTP.
Adaptation expenditure increases exponentially thereafter. 
